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Abstract
The term “Russian diaspora” is used to refer to the
twenty-five million ethnic Russians who in 1991 found
themselves politically displaced beyond the borders of the
Russian Federation and resident within newly inde-
pendent states. This paper firstly reviews the problematic
“classification” of these communities as a “diaspora.”
More specifically, by drawing on narratives of “home”
and “homeland” among those Russians “forced” to return
to the Russian Federation since 1991, it focuses on a cen-
tral pillar of diasporic identity: the relationship to “home-
land.” By exploring the everyday interactions with and
articulated narratives of Russia on “return,” the paper ar-
gues that it is upon confrontation with “the homeland”
that Russian returnees develop a sense of “otherness” from
local Russian residents and a connection with other “re-
turning Russians.” The question is raised as to whether,
rather than “coming home,” Russians returning from the
other former Soviet republics become a “diaspora in dias-
pora"?
Résumé
On utilise l’expression « diaspora russe » en référence aux
25 millions de Russes provenant d’ethnies différentes qui,
à l’échelle politique en 1991, se sont trouvés déplacés au-
delà des frontières de la Russie et sont devenus des rési-
dants d’États nouvellement indépendants. L’article
s’attarde d’abord à la problématique liée à la « classifica-
tion » de ces groupes en tant que « diaspora ». À partir
d’anecdotes se rapportant aux notions de « foyer » et de
« patrie » parmi ces Russes forcés de revenir en Russie de-
puis 1991, l’article se penche plus particulièrement sur le
pilier de l’identité de la diaspora : la relation à la « pa-
trie ». Grâce à l’exploration des interactions quotidiennes
avec la Russie et des faits racontés sur le « retour », l’arti-
cle défend le point de vue suivant : c’est par la confronta-
tion avec la « patrie » que les rapatriés russes se
sensibilisent à la notion de l’« autre » vis-à-vis des rési-
dants russes et qu’ils tissent des liens avec d’autres « rapa-
triés russes ». La question qui se pose alors est de savoir
jusqu’à quel point les Russes qui reviennent d’autres Ré-
publiques soviétiques ne deviennent-ils pas une « diaspo-
ra dans la diaspora » plutôt que de simplement retourner
chez eux.
Introduction
T
he term “Russian diaspora” refers to the twenty-five
million ethnic Russians who became politically, al-
though not physically, displaced in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union.1 On 1 January 1992, these
Russians suddenly found themselves resident in the new
geopolitical space referred to as Russia’s “near abroad.” The
question of the applicability of the term “diaspora” to the
case of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics has
received considerable attention in western academic litera-
ture since the mid 1990s,2 facilitated by a wider return to the
question of “diaspora” in the light of increasing concern
with transnational movement and, especially from post-
modernist perspectives, its implications for identity.
This paper reviews briefly the problematic “classifica-
tion” of the Russian-speaking communities in the former
Soviet republics as a “diaspora.” More specifically, how-
ever, it pursues a central pillar of diasporic identity: the
question of the relationship to “homeland.” For Russian-
speaking communities in the former republics “the home-
land” has not been a “faraway land” generating communal
myths of, and longing for, return. It has been a tangible
presence – an open door – through which individuals and
families choose, and re-choose, whether or not to walk.
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Indeed the peculiarly immanent nature of “the homeland”
in the case of the Russian diaspora provides an excellent
opportunity to explore, empirically, the centrality, or oth-
erwise, of “homeland” in diasporic identity. This is ap-
proached in the paper by examining narratives of “home”
and “homeland” among returnees to Russia, that is mem-
bers of the Russian-speaking communities who were resi-
dent in the former Soviet republics upon collapse of the
Soviet Union but who have since returned to Russia.3 By
exploring their everyday interactions with, as well as articu-
lated narratives of, Russia, the paper argues that it is in the
very process of confrontation with “the homeland” that
Russian returnees develop a sense of “otherness” from
Russians resident all their lives in Russia and, post facto, a
connection with “other Russians” from the former repub-
lics. The question thus is raised as to whether, rather than
“coming home,” Russians returning from the former re-
publics become a “diaspora in diaspora"?
The empirical data drawn on were gathered during two
distinct periods of fieldwork. During the first study, which
was conducted among returnee communities between July
and December 1994, data were gathered from a total of 195
Russian returnees, 144 of whom were settled in four rural
settlements in the Orel region, Central Russia, the remain-
ing fifty-one of whom were resident in the city of Ul’ianovsk
in the Middle Volga region of Russia.4The second study was
conducted during the period 1997–1999 in the regions of
Saratov and Samara, in the Volga region of the Russian
Federation.5 Two pilot studies were conducted in Saratov
region (August–September 1997, and April 1998) when
data were gathered from seventeen respondents. The main
period of fieldwork took place during the period June–No-
vember 1999, when data were gathered from twenty-six
respondents in Saratov region and nineteen respondents in
Samara region. In both studies, data were gathered primar-
ily through semi-structured interviews (which were taped,
and later fully transcribed and analyzed in Russian) and
extensive field observations. Observations were made at a
number of sites of migrant resettlement and the activities
of migrant associations and  regional migration  services
were monitored. In addition, basic demographic data were
gathered from respondents who were also asked to provide
details of sources and type of assistance received.
In both studies migrant communities were included
from both urban centres (Saratov, Samara, and Ul’ianovsk
cities) and rural settlements (Orel region and compact-type
settlements in outlying rural areas of the Samara and Sara-
tov regions). In the first study 73 per cent and in the second
study 82 per cent of the respondents stated their nationality
to be “Russian.”6 All but a handful of the respondents (who
had been displaced upon the territory of the Russian Fed-
eration due to the conflict in Chechnia) had left the former
republics, primarily Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakstan,
as well as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan, between
1988 and 1999. The respondents were accessed through
migrant associations, the migration service, and local aca-
demic contacts. In village locations and compact settle-
ments, whole migrant communities were interviewed; in
urban environments snowballing techniques were em-
ployed.
The regions chosen for study were areas popular for
in-migration – the Volga region, as a whole, is one of the
main regions for migrant settlement in the Russian Federa-
tion – but not regions with identified “tensions” arising
from in-migration (such as Krasnodar territory in southern
Russia). By 1 January 2000 the Volga region had received
the second highest number of forced migrants and refugees
of all Russia’s economic regions – a total of 250,840.7 These
figures do not include the large numbers of forced migrants
and refugees who have not been registered. In both studies
regions with comparable numbers of returnees but quite
different migration environments were selected. In the
1994 study, Orel region had a positive attitude to the recep-
tion of migrants (even setting “targets” for reception) while
the attractive nature of Ul’ianovsk city (given its reputation
at the time of study for social stability and low cost of living)
meant Ul’ianovsk was considerably more protectionist in
its immigration policy. Of the regions included in the
1997–99 study, Saratov region pursued a relatively liberal
migration policy and was fairly open to migrant arrival and
resettlement, and there was active co-operation between
the regional administration, the regional migration service,
and migrant associations. However, an increasingly restric-
tive attitude was detected over the period of study. Samara
region, in comparison, put greater restrictions on in-migra-
tion, the issue was not high on the agenda of the regional
administration, and there was much less co-operation and
dialogue between the migration service, relevant govern-
ment departments, and migrant initiated groups.
The “Russian Diaspora”: Academic Models
The Russian-speaking communities in the former republics
have been the object of “diasporization.” The newly inde-
pendent Russian government sought to exercise Russia’s
great-power status in the “near abroad” through a discursive
reconfiguration of the borders of post-Soviet Russia accord-
ing to the geographical location of the Russian ethnos, rather
than the current administrative borders of the Russian
state.8 Indeed it was not only ethnic Russians who were
declared to be the responsibility of the Russian government;
all ethnic groups with a cultural and historical “link” to
Russia were “diasporized” through a growing reference to
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the Russian-speaking minorities in the former republics as
“compatriots” (sootechestvenniki).9 By configuring the rela-
tionship between Russia and the Russian communities in the
“near abroad” in this way, the Russian government fur-
nished itself with the right to “defend” Russian-speakers
abroad – and thus to influence in the newly independent
states – without undermining the civic – as opposed to
ethnic – definition of the new Russian nation; the latter was
crucial to the Yeltsin government in the first part of the 1990s
as it distinguished “democrats” from “communists/nation-
alists.”10 Although, in practice, Russian government rhetoric
aimed at maintaining the Russian-speaking communities
abroad as “ours” (including the passing of a law, Concerning
the State Policy of the Russian Federation in Relation to its
Compartriots Abroad, in March 1999) was tougher than
either its real economic capabilities or its political will,11
nonetheless “diasporization” was important in that it posi-
tioned the Russian-speaking communities as an object of
Russian state concern rather than as a policy matter for the
newly independent states.
The process of “diasporization” of the Russian-speaking
communities by the Russian state has led to an ambiguous
and wide-ranging usage of the term “diaspora” in Russian
media and political discourse. As Kolstø notes the “termi-
nological anarchy” surrounding the diaspora debate dem-
onstrates the political confusion on the issue, and the
difficulty of defining who makes up this “diaspora” and its
relationship to the Russian state.12 The term is frequently
used in a general, all-encompassing manner with no critical
analysis of what constitutes this diaspora. As Kosmarskaia
comments, academics, politicians, and journalists have
tended to use “diaspora” simply as a synonym or descrip-
tive label for all the Russian-speaking populations in the
newly  independent  states.13 Engaging with wider global
debates, however, Russian academic literatures have sought
to refine the use of the term “diaspora” and to critically
evaluate its applicability, both in general conceptual terms,
and with relation to the Russian speaking communities.14
No amount of political rhetoric, however, can make the
Russians in the former republics “fit,” subjectively, a classic
diaspora model. Russian communities vary between, and
even within, the former republics by socio-economic ori-
gin, length of time in the republic, degree of integration into
the host community, and orientation towards return to
Russia. While Anthias is surely right to criticize classifica-
tory models of diaspora that ignore class, gender, and other
differences within “diaspora,”15 in Russia even the assump-
tion of common ethnicity, which lies at the core of under-
standings of “diaspora,” is problematic. During the Soviet
period, for example, although Russians formed the nucleus
of settler communities in the other republics, their ethnic
make-up depended heavily upon the region of settlement
and always included Ukrainians and Belarusians alongside
the Russians in the core group.16 The identity of the Rus-
sian-speaking communities was primarily defined in socio-
cultural rather than ethnic terms, therefore, and the
connection to the “homeland” expressed in their economic
and political placement within All-Union structures con-
trolled from Moscow, rather than in any longing for “re-
turn.”17 In current debates within Russia, for example,
liberal politicians, academics, and journalists avoid the
term “ethnic Russians” when referring to the “diaspora” in
an attempt to dilute the high degree of politicization of
diaspora discourse and to counter the tendency among the
nationalist camp to “over-ethnicize” the term.18
Secondly, although it is undoubtedly true that a greater
awareness of themselves as “Russians” was experienced by
the Russian-speaking communities in the former republics
as a result of the “nationalizing nationalisms” of their host
countries,19 the degree of that awareness was dependent not
only on the policies of individual newly independent states,
but also on the form of settlement that had developed in
particular regions whilst under imperial Russian and then
Soviet rule (size, ethnic composition, history of migration
to the region), the socio-economic position of the settlers
within each society, and the degree of cultural cleavage with
the indigenous community.20 This degree of differentia-
tion, as Graham Smith observes, meant that the Russians
showed little sense of transnational solidarity linking their
diasporic communities, either symbolically or through es-
tablished social networks. Even within any Soviet successor
state, Russian minorities displayed a weak sense of commu-
nal identity and thus a low level of collective action.21
The potential for the gradual development of a “commu-
nal identity” and ultimately a Russian “diaspora” commu-
nity in the Soviet successor states is hotly disputed in Russia.
Kudriavtsev claims that it is unlikely that a Russian diaspora
will evolve and come to play an important role in the former
republics precisely because it lacks any common ethnicity.
Boronin goes still further, arguing that the shift from a
“colonialist-paternalistic”  mentality to that of  a “perse-
cuted minority” will push the Russian “diaspora,” in time,
into self-liquidation.22 Kosmarskaia argues, however, that
while one cannot currently talk of “a diaspora” as such, the
conditions for “diasporization” are in place and thus Russia
currently has a “proto-diaspora.”23 This “emergent” dias-
pora is seen to differ from “traditional” historical diasporas
– or those forming on the basis of migrant communities in
the West – in that it takes a loose, fluid form based on
informal friendship, professional, or family ties and lacks a
mono-ethnic basis. Such “diasporization” is viewed as an
alternative to the two, often promoted, solutions to the
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current situation of the Russian-speaking communities in
the former republics – migration or assimilation.24 If this
process were to take place, Lebedeva suggests it might
coalesce around a number of key social institutions within
the former republics and would act as a positive deterrent
to further return migration.25
Thirdly, and for the purposes of this paper most signifi-
cantly, in its strictest sense a diaspora refers to a people
deprived of, or driven out of, its homeland,26 yet the Rus-
sian population in the “near abroad” has its ethnic “home-
land” adjacent and apparently open for “compatriots” to
return home at any time.27 While some, non-Russian, eth-
nic groups settled in the former republics following forcible
deportations under Stalin, the majority of Russians resident
in the former republics in 1991 arrived there through mi-
gratory processes encouraged as a means of securing the
continually expanding borders of the Russian Empire.28
The peculiar, overland, formation of the Russian Empire
marks out the “Russian diaspora” even from other coloniz-
ers “gone native.” In the Russian case, as Rogers Brubaker
notes, the original migration from core to periphery in-
volved no crossing of state borders and thus migration was
not only legally and politically defined as internal migration
but was psychologically experienced as such.29 Thus, the
migration of Russians to the outer edges of the Empire,
according to Melvin, served to strengthen the colonial state
and its institutions rather than to develop a distinct Russian
ethnic and national identity and, in the Soviet period, al-
though the boundaries of most ethnic and national com-
munities became more rigid, “the margins of the Russian
community retained a high degree of plasticity.”30 The
contiguous nature of homeland and hostland, and their
common statehood for a significant period of time, seri-
ously disrupts the classic relationship between diaspora and
“homeland”; for Russian-speaking communities in the for-
mer republics, a diasporic relationship to Russia “as home-
land” was rarely experienced and, in the last century,
frequently displaced onto “Soviet” identity.
Finally, diaspora status for Russians in the former Soviet
republics is associated not with transnational movement,
but with lack of movement; what moved in 1991 were the
borders of the Soviet “homeland,” not specific ethnic com-
munities. This is not a unique occurrence. Robin Cohen,
for example, classifies the Russians in the Soviet successor
states as a “stranded minority,” akin to Hungarians
“stranded” across a number of other European countries
upon the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire, whilst
Emil Payin calls them an “imperial minority.”31 In a similar
fashion, David Laitin refers to ethnic minorities who be-
come a diaspora as a result of boundary shifts as “beached”
diasporas,32 whilst Brubaker refers to them as “accidental’
diasporas.”33 On the same grounds – that the “diaspora”
was a result of the collapse of empire rather than flight from
the homeland – Graham Smith refers to the Russian “dias-
pora” as “borderland Russians,” suggesting thereby that
they are bound together only by their similar geographical
location vis-à-vis the homeland – Russia – rather than any
common identity.34
Transnational movement – going somewhere that is not
“home” – is surely as central to diasporic identity as the
concept of “homeland.” The transnational migration actu-
ally experienced by Russian-speaking communities since
1991, however, is not away from Russia as “homeland” but
back to “the homeland.” In the case of Russian returnees
from the former Soviet republics, this migration experience
and the experience of the “homeland” when it is confronted
upon return often results in a “misrecognition” of Russia;
Russia is reconfigured as the “other” against which some
form of diasporic identity is forged after return. In the
empirical section of the paper, the process of identity for-
mation of this “diaspora in diaspora” in the course of
everyday experience of, and engagement with, the home-
land are explored, as well as the ambiguities and limitations
inherent in such an identity.
Confronting “Homeland,” Creating “Home”:
Real Lives
The “homeland” is confronted by Russian returnees not
once – as they cross the often transparent border to Russia
– but repeatedly. “Homeland” is confronted firstly in its
imagined form, appearing as a narrative among returnees of
their life “there,” in the former republics. It is confronted
again, and on a daily basis, in the experience of “return” as
returnees negotiate for status, employment, and housing
and attempt to reconstruct “home” on Russian soil.35 The
forms of this confrontation, and their implications for post-
migration identity formation among returnee Russians, are
considered below.
Narratives of Life “There”
The lack of a distinct diasporic identity amongst the Russian
communities whilst resident in the other republics of the
Soviet Union is supported by evidence from respondents’
testimonies concerning their lives “there.” The relationship
of the returnees to the former republic was grounded, at least
partially, in imperial consciousness. Respondents describe
how they, their parents, or grandparents were sent out to the
borderlands from the “centre” – Russia – to raise the eco-
nomic and social level of the other republics as part of Soviet
modernization drives. In this sense Russians in the non-Rus-
sian republics did not self-identify as “Russians” (a signifi-
cant minority were not ethnic Russians) but socially and
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culturally as the “brightest and best,” the chosen ones sent
to bring cultural enlightenment and economic improve-
ment to the “backward” parts of the Soviet Union. In narra-
tives of life “there,” this sense of superiority is expressed
through self-identification as skilled, responsible, and con-
scientious workers, in contrast to representatives of the
titular nationalities in the former republics who are seen as
“loving management positions,” of being capable of work-
ing only in commerce and thus being incapable of doing real
work, i.e., producing:
Who worked? Only the Russians worked. They [those of the
titular nationality] are not capable of anything. Only to be
shopkeepers or work in cafes ... to water down the vodka. They
are masters at short-changing ... but physical work ... that’s not
for them. — 43, Orel, 199436
However, alongside such expressions of superiority, re-
spondents articulated an admiration for the multinational
state in which they lived and appreciation for the people,
culture, and traditions of the former republic:
… you know they are so hospitable, generous, such sincere, rich
people, we have probably learnt a lot from them, a great deal. I
do not regret that I lived there, and was born there – this feeling
of love for these people, simply this love for my homeland
(rodina), it will always remain with me. — 53, Samara, 1999
Narratives of life “there” are grounded in a sense of the
security, safeness, and completeness of life, based upon
well-established networks, connections, and roots, which
had been built up often over generations. In this sense the
former republic is quite explicitly the land of their kin, their
people (rod-ina). Respondents narrate how they, or their
ancestors before them, were born in the former republic.
They talk of growing up, getting married, and having chil-
dren  there. Their work,  their flats  and summer houses
(dachas) are located there. These latter articulations indi-
cate that not only did the former republics constitute the
respondents’  “homeland” but also where they were  “at
home” (doma).
The complexity of the relationship in relation to the
former republic is also evident in the peculiar distortion of
us/them, here/there boundaries found amongst returnee
respondents. Russian returnees frequently talk about “at
home there [the former republic]” (“u nas tam”), and
“them here [Russia]” (“oni – tut”). Although it is impossi-
ble to list all articulations of this (it is a general speech
pattern) the following statements make clear the impossi-
bility of assuming the presence of even the fundamentals of
Russian identity: common language and shared home prior
to the return “home.”
Our Tajiks are very  hospitable,  our  republic is  called little
Switzerland, it is very beautiful. — 9, Orel, 1994
... we don’t even understand the Russians. When we arrived the
first time, we could not understand the Russians, how they
speak, the language. We could not understand. They don’t
understand us, and we them. — 31, Orel, 1994
The absence of remembered desires to “return” home or
feelings of being separated (“in diaspora”) from one’s
“homeland” are conspicuous and suggests that, for Russian
returnees, the process of “returning” to Russia is an expe-
rience fraught with confrontation and contestation rather
than a smooth journey “home.”
Migration Decisions: Leaving Home or Going Home?
Despite their lack of diasporic identity, migration back to
Russia became a common response among the Russian-
speaking communities to the changing environment in the
former Soviet republics from the late 1980s. A growing sense
of “ethnic discomfort” was articulated by respondents
through reference to the disruption of the security of every-
day life, which had made this place “home.” Respondents
felt victims of discrimination on the basis of language and
nationality in the spheres of employment and education.
Daily activities, such as shopping, using public transport, or
walking down the street were no longer “safe” and unprob-
lematic. Many respondents spoke of the verbal abuse they
received on the grounds of their ethnicity and of being told
to “return” to “their Russia”:
Your homeland (rodina) is Russia – you are Russian – go back
to your Russia. — 42, Saratov, 1999
The disruption of everyday life was accompanied often
by feelings of extreme danger and insecurity, and in some
cases respondents had been caught up in violent ethnic
conflict. For a minority of respondents this experience – a
“borderland experience” – not only made them more
acutely aware  of their “Russianness” but gave  rise  to a
defensively aggressive sense of that nationality. As one re-
turnee from Moldova noted:
I am a Russian (russkii), not a Russian citizen (rossiianin) be-
cause ... I lived on the border.... On the border of the division
of nations. Russians who live here don’t understand that.... Only
now are they beginning to sense that other nationalities exist,
they have not understood this yet.... I understood this a long
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time ago...and thanks to this, there on the national periphery, I
became more Russian than the Russians here. — 136,
Ul’ianovsk, 1994
Such experiences of ethnic discomfort meant that the
adjacent “historical” homeland – Russia – now presented
itself as the logical solution to the displacement felt; migra-
tion to Russia was for many the only possible response.
Encounters with the “Homeland”: No Longer an Object
of State Concern
The process of “diasporization” of the Russian-speaking
communities in the “near abroad” by the Russian state is
important for understanding returnees’ encounters with the
homeland. While resident in the former republics, the Rus-
sians had been an object of considerable state concern. For
a minority of respondents migration to Russia was per-
ceived, therefore, as a return to an ethnic homeland:
We are Russian (russkie), we have come to our Russian brothers,
we have not just moved anywhere, we have come to our native
Russia. — 35, Saratov, 1999
Upon return, however, most returnees feel that state
concern had evaporated. The most common response to
this among respondents was a feeling of “hurt” that while
they had “done their duty” for Russia, the Russian state
considered them “redundant” and was indifferent to their
plight:
Where did the Russians in Kazakstan appear from? They came
from Russia. Then it was in the interests of Russia to send them
there – so they would open up a new land.... But now, when we
want to return, after three or four generations, because we are
being driven out – they will not take us here. We are redundant
(my ne nuzhni) — 36, Saratov, 1999
The absence of the state is tangible; the actual journeys
made by migrants and the location of places for settlement
are conducted with the assistance only of family or friend-
ship networks. This reflects the reluctance of the state to
frame these journeys as a repatriation movement rather
than as a collection of individual experiences.37 State con-
cern, it appears, is located “there,” not “here.”
This is not to suggest that the state, at the federal level,
has made no provision for returnees. In February 1993 the
Russian Federation laws On Refugees and On Forced Mi-
grants were introduced and distinguished between a
“forced migrant,” who was a citizen of the Russian Federa-
tion, and a “refugee,” who was not. Thus, from the outset,
legislative frameworks set the Russian returnees apart, and
the category of “forced migrant” seemed to be an acknow-
ledgement  by the Russian  state of a special  status.  The
Federal Migration Service (FMS) of the Russian Federation
was established in June 1992 and mandated to “protect the
rights of refugees and forced migrants and help in their
resettlement.” Federal and regional level legislation has
been introduced to further this aim, but actual implemen-
tation has been limited. Furthermore, the role of the Federal
Migration Service, and the direction of policy towards the
returning communities in general, gradually shifted from
providing protection and assistance for migrant resettle-
ment to prioritizing control and management of migration
movements. The respondents’ testimonies reveal both a
concrete lack of state provision, and a feeling of psychologi-
cal distance from the service, which is not seen as central to
“their” resettlement. Although some help is received, mi-
grants frequently mention that forced migrant status has
proved to be little more than “a piece of paper” and does
not secure any concrete help.38 There is a distinct lack of
faith in the migration service which centres around the
claim that the employees of the service cannot, and do not
want to, understand what has happened to the migrants and
are unwilling to help:
At the migration service it is not “our” people who sit there, but
“locals.” And “locals” do not understand our problems at all.
— 35, Saratov, 1999
The migration service itself has long ago given up on us. They
say, “Look, you are already here, you have citizenship, get on
with it!” — 41, Saratov, 1999
The perception of state abandonment is felt in relation
to both regional and federal administrations:
I have the feeling that they [the local administration] don’t
consider us at all. I don’t know whether it is just this local
administration [Samara] that has this attitude. I don’t know if
other migrants live better, maybe there is somewhere, where
they live worse than us. But in principle you do not expect help
from anyone, you have to survive on your own. It is evident they
have forgotten that we exist in Moscow. It has become almost
insulting. — 46, Samara, 1999
Thus, although “registered” forced migrants hold Rus-
sian citizenship and are offered some minimal state assis-
tance, the former is taken for granted by Russian returnees
while the latter is experienced as derisory. Thus “returnees”
do not feel welcomed by the Russian state and turn to other
resources – selves, family and friendship networks – in
order to recreate what constitutes “home” and secure their
inclusion in Russian society.
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One alternative to self-reliance has been participation in
migrant initiatives such as “compact settlements” and “mi-
grant associations.” The idea of “compact settlements” was
first promoted by a Russian federal level non-governmental
association, the Coordinating Council of Aid for Refugees
and Forced Migrants (CCARFM), as a “realistic solution”
to the problems of housing, employment, and adaptation
faced upon return, and as providing a necessary feeling of
security, community and social inclusion.39 The attitude of
the Federal Migration Service to the idea of compact settle-
ments fluctuated over time, alternating between support
for the idea and limited financial and material help, to open
hostility  and opposition in cases of individual compact
settlements. Many governmental and non-governmental
experts held reservations about the future of compact set-
tlements, one concern being that they might encourage the
long-term social exclusion of forced migrants. There has
been widespread recognition that settlements should only
be encouraged where they have viable locations near exist-
ing urban settlements.40 On the territory of Saratov and
Samara regions, great difficulties have been faced in the
establishment of compact settlements. Most of the settle-
ments received initial help from the migration service and
local administration. However, a subsequent lack of re-
sources, the failure of the settlements’ enterprises, conflicts
within the migrant groups, and the unsuitability of the
location of the settlement have meant that the majority are
now struggling to survive.
Attitudes to this type of settlement amongst returnees
reflect both the post-hoc diasporic identity that develops
among returnees, and also their conscious desire to recreate
“home” in their “new” homeland. Thus, compact settle-
ments are perceived as providing housing and employment
on site, but also a beneficial environment upon arrival to
facilitate inclusion because they bring together “similar”
people to themselves (that is, other migrants):
I would be very pleased, if it was all migrants – let’s say from
Tajikistan, Kazakstan – all the former republics. Because we are
from “one and the same plate.” Everything we had was the same.
We would be very good together. We understand each other.
They [“local” Russians] do not understand us.... they have their
culture, we have our culture. — 35, Saratov, 1999
On the other hand, compact settlements are also per-
ceived as working to isolate returnees in rural areas where
their professional skills cannot be applied and their families
find it difficult to integrate. Moreover, this self-contain-
ment might generate exclusion from wider society and thus
inhibit adaptation: 41
I think it is better to live together with the local population ... it
is impossible to be separate, we must integrate faster. In order
to integrate it is absolutely necessary to live with the Russians
(rossiiane). If we acquire citizenship, we want to take part in the
affairs of Russia. We will also feel ourselves to be rossiiane.
Therefore we must mix with them. Compact settlements – I do
not consider they are that good an idea. — 21, Saratov, 1999
Those migrants who have had experience of living on a
compact settlement, or who presently live in such a settle-
ment, are concerned mainly with the realities of making the
settlement work. Nevertheless, they have already invested a
great deal of physical and emotional energy into the settle-
ment and feel a sense of community strong enough to deter
them from abandoning hope in its eventual success:
We have to persevere, the place here is not bad, it is beautiful,
we hope to achieve something here. The children like it, and we
have already become accustomed, we know the place, it already
seems a shame to leave. And here living on the hillside, we have
our clan, we ... are all newcomers (priezhie), we have our com-
munity (obshchina), we have our own outlook and views, a lot
of us do not want to leave the hillside, we already want to build
our settlement here. — 59, Samara, 1999
While the Russian-speaking communities in the former
republics have failed largely to generate their own commu-
nity organizations, returnees have developed migrant asso-
ciations rapidly which help fill the gap left by the lack of
government provision. In Saratov and Samara regions a
number of associations have been established,42 although
many respondents either had not heard of them or did not
know what they did. Others identified migrant associations
as yet another “official” structure in which one should have
little faith as a source of help. Migrants who had contact
with the associations, or were actually involved in their
operation, had a different perception of the role and impor-
tance of such bodies, however. They were seen clearly as a
response to state indifference, and as a source of real poten-
tial help:
... if the government does not care, then we must come together
in a group, what other way is there? — 37, Saratov, 1999
Moreover, although a formal structure, migrant associa-
tions were considered, unlike official government struc-
tures, to approach migrants with understanding and
empathy. The reason for this is that the associations are run
by migrants, who both have had a similar experience of
displacement and may have come from the individual’s
previous “homeland”:
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She [the head of one association] always listens to you when you
go there, she will always give you advice. She is our fellow
countrywoman (zemliachka), also from Uzbekistan. She knows
what it is like, she has gone through it herself, so it is easier for
her to understand. — 41, Saratov, 1999
If people have gone through it themselves, they understand that
it is very difficult. All the people try to support you with warm
words, to provide help in some way, to do something. In the
migration service it is more difficult, you go there and it is like
a “deaf wall,” a wall that doesn’t understand, and people who
do not understand – that a person has come with nothing, has
to start again, and that adaptation is very difficult. Here [in the
migrant association] it is easier, you can always run to the
association with any question. — 50, Samara, 1999
To those migrants who are included in the sphere of
activity of the migrant associations feelings of group iden-
tity are generated, which draw upon the common experi-
ence of both residence in, and displacement from, a former
republic. Both the compact settlements and the migrant
associations create spaces where feelings of common iden-
tity are discovered and fostered. However, there is great
diversity of interest and identity amongst the migrant com-
munity and many returnees do not consider the associa-
tions as integral to the process of resettlement. For them
resettlement remains an individual or family centred proc-
ess, and the reconstruction of “home” and “homeland” one
of personal negotiation.
“Other Russians”: Local Encounters with “Homeland”
The process of resettlement fosters a sense of “difference”
among Russians returning to the Russian Federation; this
difference is grounded clearly in the experience of life
“there,” but is framed in terms of sites of confrontation with
the “homeland” and, in particular, in opposition to “local”
Russians. The feelings of superiority rooted in imperial con-
sciousness, which were expressed vis-à-vis the titular popu-
lation in the former republic, are also voiced upon “return”
and in relation to the local population. Returnees consis-
tently described local Russians as: rude, disrespectful (espe-
cially of their elders), linguistically impoverished, drunken,
and lazy:
... by nationality I am Russian but I consider myself Soviet.... I
don’t consider myself a rossiianka ... the locals ... they are pure
rossiiskie people ... a Russian [russkii] it seems to me should be
a good, kind, considerate, hospitable person, a cultured, educated
person, but a rossiiskii – that is about getting drunk, not going to
work, all that...all the bad characteristics. — 119, Orel, 1994
... the cultural level in Russia is very low, relationships between
people are completely different, ... those who have arrived, they
are highly educated and highly specialized. They are very hard-
working, and  come  with the desire  to work  ... it is highly
qualified, cultured, intellectual, well brought up people who
have arrived. — 53, Samara, 1999
Although the returnees do think of themselves as ethni-
cally “Russian,” they feel their Russianness to be challenged
by the local population. Returnees claimed that they were
labelled as outsiders by locals who referred to them as:
“newcomers” or “strangers” (priezhie), “immigrants” (im-
migranty), “emigrants [sic]” (emigranty), “migrants” (mi-
granty and pereselentsy), “refugees” or, according to the
republic they have come from, “Kazaks,” “Kirghiz,” etc.
This, returnees said, meant that they were effectively ex-
cluded from the common ethnic and civic community:
The same Russians don’t accept us as Russians.... We have no
rights at all here. — 1, Orel, 1994
It is us who are strangers, we who have arrived. Yes, we are
Russians (russkie), but we are not perceived as Russians. We are
strangers, and I think that our children, who have come with
us, they will also be strangers. — 45, Saratov, 1999
I am Russian (russkaia), my husband is Russian (russkii), but
everyone treats me as a Kazak (Kazashka) at work, if you are
from Kazakstan [to them] it means you are a Kazak.
— 49, Samara, 1999)
The returnees also complained that general economic
problems were blamed on increased competition generated
by their arrival:
... we are not treated well, all the time we are called “blacks” ...
“foreigners”.... They don’t like us. Many say “you have taken
our flats.” Very many complain “you have swarmed down on
us, taken our jobs, our flats, because of you, life is tough here
now....” — 178, Ul’ianovsk, 1994
… it seems to them that we take their work, their money. When
a country “fills up,” there are soon difficulties, therefore people
already look at you in a different way. We are like competitors
for “life.” — 36, Saratov, 1999
Encounters with the homeland at the local level thus
engender a sense among returnees that though they may be
Russians, they are “other” Russians:
Although we are Russians (russkie), we are not the same kind of
Russians that live here. — 1, Orel, 1994
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This essence of this “otherness” lies at the heart of the
“diaspora-in-diaspora” identity; returnees differentiate
themselves from local Russians by ascribing to “self” those
positive characteristics attributed to the peoples of the re-
public of former residence. Many respondents openly ac-
knowledged a kind of “hybrid” identity, saying that they
had assimilated much from the peoples they had lived with:
We arrived like that … the East is like that. We were taught like
that there. The Uzbeks, the Tajiks they are all like that. For them
the main thing is the family ... that is why we have got more in
common with the [other] newcomers (priezhie) than with the
locals. There is a big difference between us and them. — 20,
Orel, 1994
... here we are all newcomers (priezhie). We are all close to each
other in spirit. Everyone is from Central Asia here, I came from
there. We have our own way of life, although I am Russian
(russkaia), my way of life is more similar to an Eastern woman’s.
Therefore we have found a common language. Newcomers,
no-one loves them anywhere. Here, we are all together, we are
all a group...we can communicate, we have a great deal in
common, our way of life, for example. We even have the same
dishes, if you go to that extent. We prepare dishes in the same
way. It means a great deal. And to have left there, to have lost
everything, left everything…. such little things give you joy. We
have common recollections, a common outlook. It is something
important for us. — 27, Saratov, 1999
A sense of common experience and common identity
thus appears to emerge among returnees as a product of the
daily encounter and confrontation with the “historical
homeland” after return to Russia.
Revisiting the Concept of “Diaspora”:
Constructions of “Home” and “Homeland”
Evidence of a common identity amongst returnees is not
proof of “diasporic” identity. The latter claim, once again,
requires evidence of the centrality of the old (former repub-
lic) homeland to the sense of community among returnees.
The articulation of “homeland” in returnees’ narratives,
however, suggests that although “homeland” is important
to returnees’ identity, it is not a single concept, but is fluid
and under constant re-formation throughout the process of
reconstructing “home” in Russia.
The understanding of “homeland” (rodina) in the nar-
ratives of returnees is complex. Around two-thirds of re-
spondents in Orel region expressly said they did not
consider their migration to Russia to be a return to the
rodina. The majority of respondents from Saratov and Sam-
ara regions, when they spoke of their rodina also placed it
“there” (in the former republic). This is, in many ways,
logical. Linguistically, the term rodina fixes homeland as the
“place of birth,” and many respondents identified their
rodina as “there,” where they were born:
I was born there, lived there. Of course it is hard. You yearn ...
for your homeland. And that homeland is there, there where
you were born, in spirit you never leave. — 189, Orel, 1994
Rodina, is where you are born, we were born in Tajikistan, our
homeland is there. — 11, Saratov, 1997
For other respondents homeland was linked to the for-
mer USSR as a whole and the latter’s disappearance was
thus experienced as bereavement. The sense of loss is as
much for the security of the “past” – of employment, hous-
ing, established friends, and community – as for any con-
sciously multi-ethnic society, of course. The insecurity and
uncertainty faced upon return to Russia thus generate a
bitter sense of loss of belonging:
We haven’t got one [rodina]. We are aliens there and here we
are aliens ... the children were born there in Uzbekistan. We
haven’t got a homeland! — 125, Orel, 1994
For others, however, although they share a sense of
having “no homeland,” their focus is the “present” process
of reconstructing “home.” By rebuilding one’s “home” –
signifying the security of housing and employment, the
establishment of family and friends, security, and a future
for their children – they establish the foundations for a
future “homeland” on the territory of Russia. The process
is not one of return to a familiar ethnic community, but a
process of “becoming” or “rooting”:
There I am a stranger, and here I am still not myself. That is, I
am between the sky and earth. I am not there, or here...if
everything were settled, if there were housing and work, then I
could say I would never leave here – it would be my “home.”
— 43, Saratov, 1999
My rodina is there, where I was born, where my friends are. But
I think Russia has to become my “home.” If there is housing,
then Russia will become homeland and home, because our
children will be here. Our children will have children, and there
will be grandchildren. Therefore I will consider that Russia – it
is my home. — 35, Saratov, 1999
These narratives describe a process of “recreation” and
transferral. There is a clear acceptance that the period of
rodina being “there” is over in a physical, lived sense. Re-
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spondents rarely envisaged return as a real possibility, al-
though the memory of homeland “there” remained potent.
The first step was to recreate “home” in Russia; if they
managed this successfully, it might become “homeland” for
future generations:
I cannot say that I exactly feel at home. But, I feel calm, simply
calm. It is already the children, grandchildren, this will be their
rodina in time, when it has all settled down. —39, Saratov, 1999
Statements made by returnees concerning their “home-
land” are complex and contradictory. While theorists of the
postmodern would suggest that the contemporary world of
diaspora, mass population movement, and transcultural
flows naturally problematize the notion of homeland,43 this
does not fully explain the sentiments expressed by respon-
dents. For Russian-speaking returnees, there was no prob-
lem of  envisaging  what  constituted a  homeland; it  was
clearly symbolized by “where I was born,” “where the chil-
dren were born,” and “where my parents are buried.” The
problem was rather a sudden disembodiment of that home-
land. The “imagined community” (Russia) had been sev-
ered from the physical homeland (former republic) leaving
individuals and communities displaced. To resolve this
displacement, many Russian-speakers in the former Soviet
republics took the migration option. Their experience of
“return” to Russia, however, was not one of “going home”
to an ethnic homeland, but of recognizing, post-factum, a
diasporic identity and then seeking to re-root themselves
through actively reconstructing “home.”
Conclusion
The peculiar process of settlement of Russians in the former
Soviet republics and the process of their objective, but not
subjective, “diasporization” in the post-1991 period proble-
matize the application of a classic “diaspora” model to the
experience of these stranded, imperial minorities. In par-
ticular the central relationship between diaspora and
“homeland” is disrupted. Until the late 1980s, generations
of Russian-speakers in the former Soviet republics envisaged
no split between physical homeland as where they lived,
where their children were born, and where their parents had
died, and homeland as “imagined community.” The Soviet
homeland (sovetskaia rodina) embodied both. The rise in
ethnic tension through the 1980s and the sudden collapse of
the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, however, severed the
two, leaving the Russian communities displaced.
This paper has explored one resolution of this displace-
ment: migration, or rather return to “historical homeland.”
It has suggested that the experience of encountering Russia
as homeland, however, does not necessarily bring those in
diaspora “home,” but often engenders a sense of “other-
ness” and exclusion. What appears to emerge is a sense of
common identity among Russians from the former repub-
lics  upon  return,  which  had not  been present  while  in
diaspora; a “diaspora-in-diaspora” identity? The possibility
that diasporic identity may be stronger amongst those
forced to “return” to their historical “rodina” than amongst
those who remain “there” has indeed been suggested by
Gradirovskii.44 To talk of such an identity, however, surely
stretches the concept of “diaspora” too far. Rather than
make claims for such an identity, therefore, the paper has
suggested that it might be useful to unpack the notion of
“homeland” into “home” and “land.” This would disavow
the primacy of a primordial connection between ethnos
and territory embodied in the notion of “homeland.” It
suggests, rather,  that  homelands “become” through the
siting of an individual’s “home” (kin, family, past, present,
future, job, house). What returnee experience reveals is that
everyday encounters and confrontations with the “ethnic
homeland” engender both a diasporic longing for the
“homeland” left behind whilst at the same time siting indi-
viduals and families in a space which they will make “home”
for themselves and “homeland” for their children.
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